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Abstract 
 
The publicly-managed Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) defined-benefit pension scheme in 
Vietnam is described, with an analysis of its financial sustainability in the context of an 
aging society in a dynamically efficient economy. By using actuarial models developed 
by the International Labor Organization (ILO), the paper finds that the implicit pension 
debt (IPD) of the scheme is high in comparison with GDP of the year 2000, which is 
the base year for projections. Regarding the social aspect, a high IPD implies that the 
burden of maintaining this scheme is borne by the current and future participants. For 
this reason, the pension scheme in Vietnam will cause not only financial instability but 
also inter-generational inequity. In order to avoid this situation, the current scheme 
needs to be reformed. In particular, Vietnam should move to a partially-funded defined-
contribution scheme with careful considerations of social and economic impacts so as 
to avoid both financial instability and inter-generational inequity. 
 
 
Glossary 
 
Compliance rate. The ratio of the number of people on whose behalf contributions are actually paid to 
the scheme to the number of people who are legally covered by the scheme.  
Contribution rate. A determined percentage of the covered insurable earnings that is to be collected for 
the financing of the scheme. 
Defined benefit scheme. A scheme which defines the standards of the benefits to be provided by means 
of a formula and determines the financial system accordingly. This formula, which determines 
pensions or lump-sum payments, is tied to years worked, earnings and social criteria. Some 
entity (the state, employer, insurance company) bears the financial risk of the promise or 
entitlement embedded in the formula. 
Defined contribution scheme. A scheme which defines its benefits in terms of the contributions to be 
paid into individual accounts, together with shares of investment income, from which the benefit 
will be paid when qualifying conditions are satisfied. The workers bear financial risk.  
Implicit pension debt (net). The value of outstanding pension claims on the public sector minus 
accumulated pension reserves. 
Notional defined-contribution (NDC) scheme. This is a scheme where a worker’s account is set up as 
a bookkeeping device, to keep track of contributions plus imputed interest at a rate determined 
by the government, but funds are never accumulated in these accounts. Instead, money is used to 
pay current benefits and the accounts are notional or empty. When the worker reaches 
retirement age, the notional accumulation in his/her account is converted into annuity (its size 
depends on the expected duration of retirement and the interest rate) and paid to the retirement 
out of contributions that younger workers are making at that time, as they build up their own 
accounts. 
Old-age dependency ratio. Residents above 60 years of age divided by the residents between 15 and 
60 years of age. 
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG). A social security financial system under which current revenues (mostly from 
contributions such as payroll taxes) are used to cover current benefits (e.g. mandatory old age 
pensions) year by year. 
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) cost rate. This is the result from dividing the total expenditure by the total 
contributory earnings and indicates the contribution rate needed to balance income with 
expenditure. 
Replacement ratio. Proportion of pre-retirement income available as an annuity during retirement. 
Total fertility rate. The number of children who would be born to a woman if she were to live to the 
end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility 
rates. 
Youth dependency ratio. The ratio of the population younger than age 15 to the population aged 15 to 
60. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Demographic changes have significant impacts on the social and economic performances of 
countries, regions and the whole world. Recently, the most observable demographic change is the 
phenomenon of rapidly aging population. The proportion of the elderly in the total population is sharply 
increasing due to declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. Population aging requires huge 
public expenditures for the aged on pensions, health and medical care, and influences government 
budgets, pension funds, and eventually long-term fiscal sustainability. The problem of an aging 
population becomes more serious if it is associated with the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) defined-benefit 
pension scheme. Recent empirical analyses indicate that these two issues are potential threats to the 
financial stability of the pension fund in particular, and the government budget in general in almost all 
economies in the world*.  
In addition to the problem of financial instability arising from an aging society, PAYG defined-
benefit pension schemes also cause inter-generational inequity. Along with the aging population, this 
issue is becoming more severe because young and future workers have to pay greater contributions to 
cover expenditures for the current pensioners. Hence, the pension scheme will, sooner or later, collapse 
because of contribution evasion, generous benefits, and huge implicit pension debt. These related 
aspects of the issue are described by Gokhale (1996), Feldstein (1998), Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1998), 
Takayama et al. (1998), and Kunieda (2001). 
Even though Vietnam is still a young economy with about 7 percent of its total population aged 
60 and over, it will also face the same problems of aging as other countries in the next fifty years. 
Thanks to the recent impressive economic growth and social progress, higher living standards of 
Vietnamese people have led to increasing life expectancy at birth from 40.2 years in 1950 to 64.8 and 
69.2 in 1990 and 2001, respectively; and declining fertility rates from 6 children per woman in 1960 to 
3.4 and 2.33 in 1990 and 2001, respectively (GSO, 2002). According to the population projections of 
the United Nations (2002) for Vietnam in 2050, the number of persons aged 60 and over will account 
for around 24 percent of the total population; and the elderly and demographic dependency ratios will 
be 42 and 77 percent, respectively. Further, the current publicly-managed PAYG defined-benefit 
pension scheme in Vietnam is inherently fragile in financial stability due to limited coverage, low 
contributions along with a relatively high replacement rate. The combination of these factors will result 
in an obvious consequence: deterioration of the scheme with an increasing financial instability. The 
most recent actuarial valuation on the social security system of Vietnam finds that the social fund will 
be depleted in 2030 if no policy measures are taken (ILO, 1998). This is an imminent pitfall of the 
pension scheme in the near future, and policy options sustaining the pension scheme need to be urgently 
explored. 
This paper aims to analyze the financial sustainability of the pension scheme in Vietnam up to the 
year 2050. It discusses the issues of financial viability and stability, and inter-generational inequity of 
                                                  
*  See, for example, Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989), Auerbach et al. (1989), Holzmann (1997, 1998), and 
Holzmann et al. (2001). 
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 the scheme. It then suggests policy reforms in order to stabilize the scheme and ensure inter-
generational equity. 
 
II. PENSION SCHEME IN VIETNAM: CURRENT STATUS AND CHALLENGES 
 
The pension scheme in Vietnam is a component of the social insurance system, which has been in 
operation since 1962. Before 1995, the pension scheme was defined-benefit, which covered only the 
employees of the state sector, and it was managed by different agencies under the supervision of the 
government. In that scheme, the benefit levels for retirement were defined by the number of working 
years and base earnings (normally, the wage at the time of retirement). The benefits were paid by the 
social insurance fund, which was created to receive contributions from employers through the payroll, 
and subsidies from the government budget. The fund was managed and guaranteed by the government, 
and was a component of the government budget. In almost thirty years, especially during the rigorous 
war, the scheme significantly contributed to the income and living stabilization of the insured people.  
The complications and difficulties arising from administrative and financial managements of the 
scheme associated with the growing private sector, however, forced the government to reform the 
scheme, and led to the establishment of a publicly-managed PAYG defined-benefit scheme in 1995, 
where the Vietnam Social Insurance (VSI) is responsible for management under the guarantees of the 
government. 
 
1. Key Features and Shortcomings of the Scheme 
 
Coverage Rate and Benefits 
The current pension scheme is mandatory for (i) employees of the state sector, i.e. officials of 
the government, party organizations, and the armed forces; (ii) employees of the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs); and (iii) private enterprises with ten employees or more, including foreign-affiliated enterprises, 
foreign agencies, enterprises in industrial parks and export-processing zones, and international 
organizations. Further, Vietnamese people who are working abroad, and foreigners who are working in 
Vietnam can also participate in the scheme via voluntary insurance. 
In practice, however, the coverage rate of the scheme is very low because it is inherently 
limited to the state sector, in particular SOEs, and there are few participants in the voluntary scheme. 
According to VSI (2001), the current pension scheme coverage was almost universal for the public 
sector with 95 percent of civil servants, and 93 percent of the employees in SOEs. The state sector 
employees made up 86 percent of the active contributors, while the remaining 14 percent was for 
participants from the private sector (Figure 1). This situation can also be seen in Table 1.  
The benefits provided are mainly long-term, including pensions for retirement, survivors, 
employment injury, and disability. In addition, there are lump-sum benefits for related beneficiaries of 
the above long-term benefits, such as grant for funeral, lump-sum payments for early retirements, and 
low-level injured and disabled people. 
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 Figure 1. Number of Active Contributors by Economic Sectors, 2000 (Thousand of people) 
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Table 1. Participation to the Scheme by Economic Sectors, 2000 
 Public Sector Private Sector 
% Labor Force 10 90 
% Active Contributors 86 14 
Compliance Rate (%) 95 27 
Source: GSO (2001), VSI (2001) 
 
The retirement pension is normally paid to men and women at the age of 60 and 55, respectively, 
with at least 20 years of contributions according to the specific formulas. For instance, the benefit 
formula is calibrated by multiplying the base earning by a service factor, in which base earning is 
measured by the average monthly salary during a certain period of time, e.g. the last 5 years’ average 
monthly salary for state sector employees. The service factor is measured with 3 percent for the first 
fifteen years, and 2 percent thereafter, or minus 1 percent for each year of early retirement. The total 
benefit, however, would not exceed 75 percent of the base earning. 
The other pensioners, i.e. the survivors, the injured, and the disabled are paid with strictly 
qualified conditions. All kinds of pensions are adjusted to the statutory wage (or minimum wage), and 
the minimum pension is equivalent to the minimum wage.  
In the current pension scheme, there are two kinds of beneficiaries, i.e. pre-1995 and post-1995 
pensioners. The former are paid directly by the government budget, while the latter is entitled and paid 
by the VSI. In fact, VSI is responsible for the payments of both pensioners, and it will receive 
repayments from the government through the Ministry of Finance (MoF). 
In the new scheme, the average monthly pension was about 475,000 VND, with a replacement 
rate of about 56 percent, which was relatively higher than that of other countries. Additionally, the 
dependency ratio of the scheme (or scheme demographic ratio) in 2000 at only 5.4 percent indicated 
that the number of pensioners was about 5.4 percent of the number of contributors, and also implied the 
scheme’s youth. Hence, the PAYG cost rate of the scheme, which is measured by multiplying the  
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 Table 2. Active Contributors and Pensioners, 2000 
Category Number of persons (thousand) 
Average monthly 
salary/benefits 
(thousand VND) 
ACTIVE CONTRIBUTORS 
Government officials (including armed-forces’) 1,973 775 
Employees in SOEs 1,854 775 
Employees in private sector 649 1,220 
Total 4,476 840 
PENSIONERS 
1. Pre-1995 pensioners, of which 2,168 539 
Retirement 1589 625 
Disability 427 356 
Employment injury 8 273 
Survivors’ 144 125 
2. Post-1995 pensioners, of which 243 475 
Retirement 141 691 
Employment injury 19 339 
Survivors’  83 138 
Total 2,411 532 
Source: VSI (2001) 
 
replacement rate by the scheme demographic ratio, was approximately 3 percent, implying that the total 
incurred expenditure was about 3 percent of the total insurable earnings from all the participants of the 
scheme. This is also called sustainable contribution rate, meaning the rate to balance revenue and 
expenditure of the scheme.  
The total insurable earnings of the scheme were about 10 percent of nominal GDP in 2000 due 
to the low level of taxable wages in the public sector, low coverage rate, and individual income tax 
evasion, especially from the private sector. 
 
Financing and Financial Status 
The financing of the scheme consists of contributions, subsidies from the government, investment 
income, and other sources (Article 149, amended Labor Code (2002): p.82).  
Contributions to the social insurance scheme comprise 5 percent of monthly salary from 
employees for retirement, survivors’ benefits, grants for funeral expenses; and 15 percent of employer’s 
total wages paid to the employees who are covered by the social insurance, which 10 percent is for 
long-term benefits, i.e. retirement, employment injury, disability, and survivors; and remaining 5 
percent is for short-term benefits, i.e. sickness and maternity. 
The subsidies from the government are composed of payments for the pre-1995 pensioners, and 
other expenses, such as training, material base construction and delivery fees of payments. 
The reserve after balancing the fund is invested to earn interest. In practice, given the shortage of 
the financial instruments and assets in the financial sector, the investments of the social security fund 
have concentrated on safe sources with very low rates of return. These are predominantly in the public 
sector: 52 percent deposited in public banks, 36 percent for lending the Government’s national projects, 
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 and the remaining 12 percent in treasury bills and other investments (VSI, 2001). The estimated average 
nominal rate of return on the investments of the scheme’s reserves was 4.85 percent annually (Figure 2). 
 
 Figure 2. Investment Structure of Social Fund, 2000 
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In order to finance the operation, the VSI retains about 6 percent of total contributions for 
admin
 benefits of the current scheme, as is the nature of a PAYG defined-benefit 
pensio
anagement and Regulatory Framework
istrative costs. The actual administrative costs of the scheme on average, however, were about 
4.17 percent of the total contributions in the period 1996-2000 (Anh, 2001) so that the remnant at 2 
percent of the total contributions would be a potential source of mismanagement, such as corruption, 
fraud, or extravagance. 
Contributions and
n scheme, are irrelevant as its the financial viability may be exhausted in the future. The problem 
of financial instability of the pension scheme in Vietnam is more obvious in the conditions of loose 
early retirement provisions (which were considered as a solution to reduce surplus labor in SOEs) and a 
foreseen aging population. According to MOLISA (2001), the actual average retirement age was about 
5 years lower than the legal age; 60 percent of the current retirees were early retired, and 12 percent 
were retired at age of 45 and below (Figure 3). This situation indicates that the retirement period of 
retirees will extend along with higher life expectancy, and the pension burden of these beneficiaries will 
abruptly increase when benefits are indexed to an increasing minimum wage. 
 
M  
e for both short-term and long-term functions, which 
previo
Since 1995 VSI has been responsibl
usly belonged to the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), and the Ministry of 
Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), respectively. VSI now has a hierarchical structure that 
expands to the lowest district levels, and the local agents of VSI are responsible for both collections and 
disbursements. This vertical management of the scheme effectuates an increasing number of 
participants by updating information on employed labor from local levels. However, it also gives rise to 
increasing administrative costs, which may create risks of corruption and fraud, as mentioned above. 
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 Moreover, administrative co-operation between VSI and other ministries, in particular the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment (MPI) which is responsible for managing all kinds of enterprises throughout 
the country, are not effective so that social security contribution evasion is frequently observed, 
especially in the private sector. 
Along with managerial problems, the regulatory framework concerning tax treatment between the 
social
Figure 3. Number and Age Structure of the Current Retirees, 2000 
 
Source: MOLISA (2002) 
 security system and other instruments of contractual savings is also exacerbating the issue of 
evasion. For instance, contributions from employers and employees, and the accruals from life 
insurance and pension funds are deductible for the purposes of corporate or individual income tax, while 
the contributions to the pension annuity plans are not deductible for any purpose; hence it creates 
motivation for enterprises to evade contributions by reducing the registered number of employees, 
signing short-term labor contracts with long-term employees, and so on. 
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 2. Challenges of the scheme 
 
From the social and economic standpoints, the pension scheme in Vietnam faces two challenges. 
The first is the short-term challenges concerning the low participation rate of the private sector, and 
inefficient management of the scheme. The second is the long-term problems, which result from the 
short-term problems combined with a rapidly aging population, in which the dependency ratio of the 
scheme will be swiftly increased.  
 
Short-term Challenges 
As mentioned above, in the year 2000, the number of contributors from the private sector was 
only 14 percent of the scheme’s total number of active contributors, and the compliance rate to the 
scheme was only about 27 percent. One of the most important causes of this situation is that the legal 
coverage of the scheme is too narrow for the private sector. Additionally, due to the economic 
restructuring with labor retrenchment, the number of employees in the public sector, especially in SOEs, 
is being redu rs move to the private sector without any re-registration for social 
sequently the participation rates of the scheme are reduced.  
Furthermore, pre-1995 retirees receiving benefits from the government budget account for 66 
perce
ced. These laid-off worke
security responsibility, and con
nt and 92 percent of the total number of pensioners and retirees, respectively, and almost of them 
are much younger than the legal retirement age. Therefore, the pension burdens of these retirees, namely 
implicit pension debt (IPD), will increase when they have higher life expectancy and pension wages. 
 
Long-term Challenges 
These short-term problems associated with an aging population will create long-term problems in 
ding its financial sustainability. 
 
the pension scheme regar
Figure 4. Dependency Ratios in Vietnam, 2000-2050 
 
Source: The UN population prospects (2002) 
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 The strict family easing life expectancy 
thanks to improved living standards have made Vietnam’s population age rapidly. According to the 
population prospects of the United Nations for Vietnam, the elderly (age 60 and older) in 2025 and 2050 
will make up around 13 percent and 24 percent of the total population, respectively, double and triple of 
that in the year 2000. Furthermore, the average life expectancy of the Vietnamese population is also 
estimated to increase from 69.2 years in 2000 to 74.1 years and 78.2 years in 2025 and 2050, 
respectively. Consequently, the elderly and demographic dependency ratios will sharply increase, 
putting pressure on the working-age population. For instance, the elderly and demographic dependency 
ratios will increase from 13 and 69 percent in 2000 to 42 and 77 percent in 2050, respectively, while the 
total working-age population will decrease sharply after reaching its assumed peak in 2030. 
The long-term sustainability of the pension scheme is threatened by several factors. Firstly, the 
scheme has approached a relatively high level of maturation with a high dependency ratio. Secondly, the 
contribution rate will be far below the sustainable level, which is measured by the PAYG cost rate of the 
scheme, and the social insurance fund will be depleted. Thirdly, there is a decreasing compliance rate 
becau
III. M
There are three projection models, i.e. general population, 
macro
planning policy during the period 1970-1990 and incr
se of (i) the contraction of the public sector, in particular SOEs; (ii) the movement from the public 
sector to the private sector of laid-off workers without re-registrations in the social security system; and 
(iii) the low participation rate of the private sector itself. Fourthly, the statutory wage-indexed benefits 
are too generous, and the retirement period is longer due to early retirement and higher life expectancy. 
In addition, these long-term problems become more serious if they are considered from the aspect 
of fairness among generations. As indicated in numerous previous studies, PAYG defined-benefit 
pension scheme in the context of aging population means that the young and future generations have to 
bear heavier burden to cover the expenditure of the pensioners. The heavier burden is expressed by a 
continuous increase in the contribution rate, creating motivation for the active participants to evade their 
contributions and to have earlier retirements. 
All of these factors will generate considerable problems for the pension scheme, and they may 
lead to a pension crisis in the future, characterized by financial instability and inter-generational 
inequity. Sustaining the scheme financially and maintaining the equity among generations are difficult 
policy questions for any PAYG defined-benefit scheme in the context of aging society. Hence, finding 
policies that are appropriately adapted to specific social and economic situations to remedy these 
problems and stabilize the scheme is imperative. 
 
 
ETHODOLOGIES FOR FINANCIAL PROJECTION OF PENSION SCHEMES 
 
This section makes use of the methodologies for social security pensions developed by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) to assess the long-term financial status of a pension scheme. 
These methodologies are then modified to fit the socio-economic situation of Vietnam in general, and 
the pension scheme of Vietnam in particular. 
economy, and financial measures of the pension scheme. 
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 There are three steps in assessing the actuarially financial status of the pension scheme, i.e. status-
quo projections, sensitivity tests, and policy proposals for reform. The first projects by assuming that the 
management and regulatory framework are not changed, even in the changing contexts of population 
growth and socio-economy. The second examines the previous projections with different assumptions 
f scheme indicators, e.g. compliance rates, contribution and benefit rates, to see how the results are 
ifferent from the status-quo projections. The third proposes some policy reforms to make the scheme 
1. Ge
ut is still over 2.1 children per woman, 
which
 total employment as a percentage of the 
itial working-age population, along with its evolution of participation rates can help project future 
 projected working-age population. The projected unemployed 
opulation is therefore calculated as a residual of the projected working-age population and projected 
total e
Source: ILO (1998) 
o
d
financially stable, and to achieve inter-generational equality. 
 
neral Population Projections 
 
The projections of general population for Vietnam are taken from the United Nations Population 
Prospects (2002) with medium-fertility assumptions. These assumptions are employed because the 
average total fertility rate in Vietnam currently is decreasing, b
 is a balanced level of population reproduction. 
 
2. Labor Market Projections 
 
From the initial general population, and the demographic indicators, e.g. fertility, mortality, and 
migration rates, the future general population is projected, including the projected working-age 
population, e.g. 15 to 59 year-olds. Furthermore, the initial
in
total employment according to the
p
mployment (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Method of Labor Market Projections 
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 Normally, total employment also includes people who are at lower or higher age than legal 
working age, but their participation is usually negligible or inaccurately informed so that projections for 
these groups may be omitted. Moreover, total employment can also be projected by dividing real GDP 
by labor productivity. The data on the labor productivity, however, are usually not available or 
inaccurate, so that it is also infeasible to employ this method. 
. Macroeconomic Projections 
conomic Growth and Interest Rates
 
3
 
E  
In the short-term, the annual GDP growth rate may be based on the estimates of the short-term 
conomic projections in the national economic strategy. For the long-term, the GDP growth rate is 
d as an exogenous variable. The short-term and long-term assumptions on GDP 
growt
es, and it is usually indicated by annual 
verage Consumer Price Index (CPI). Assumptions about future inflation rates are essential for the 
f the pensions are periodically adjusted to reflect price increases in the 
conomy, i.e. inflation indexation. Inflation projections may be based on the estimates of the national 
rial assessment, the inflation rate is also an exogenous input in 
the ec
e
generally establishe
h are linked with each other by the interpolation technique. Nominal GDP is calculated by 
multiplying real GDP by the GDP deflator in each year. The GDP deflator in the past is measured by 
dividing nominal GDP by real GDP. The future evolution of the GDP deflator is usually based on the 
assumptions of the future GDP inflation rates. 
Inflation represents the general rate of increase in pric
a
actuarial projections of pensions i
e
economic strategy. Note that, in an actua
onomic model. 
 
Wages and Interest Rates 
In status-quo projections, wage projections are based on the government policy, i.e. statutory 
wage indexation. Therefore, wage will be projected by using the historical adjustments of statutory 
wage. In the short-term, it may be adjusted by the most recent developments in wage levels. In the 
medium and long-term, however, due to the nature of actuarial method, the real wage growth rate is 
usuall
y following the adjustments of insurable earnings. 
The level of interest rate can be projected by using the historical rate in the reports of the central 
nomy is dynamically efficient, meaning that rate of return on capital is 
higher
y assumed to merge with the rate of growth in labor productivity, which is measured by 
subtracting the growth rate of total employment from the real GDP growth rate.  
The total remuneration for employees is calculated by multiplying the average wage by the 
number of employees. Regarding the pension scheme, the total insurable earnings are measured by 
multiplying the average insurable earnings by the number of active contributors. The average wage for 
pensions can be obtained b
bank. In addition, if the eco
 than growth rate of population plus per capita growth rate in steady state, the interest rate is 
projected, in average, higher than the economic growth rate. Regarding the reserves of the pension 
scheme, average rate of returns depends on past investments, and also the development of interest rates 
in the financial market. 
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 4. Financial Projections of the Pension Scheme 
 
The financial projections of the pension scheme depend mainly on the number of people who will 
pay into the scheme (or the number of active contributors), and the average earnings of these 
contributors. Also importantly are the number of people who will receive benefits (or the number of 
pensioners), and the amount of benefits that will be paid, related to past earnings and possibly indexed. 
Finally, investment returns on reserves, and other incomes and expenses are also factored. 
 
Number of Active Contributors 
The projected number of insurable people who must register for social security as stipulated in the 
government regulations on coverage may be calculated as a proportion of projected total employment. 
Regarding the pension scheme in Vietnam, there are three kinds of potential beneficiaries who belong to 
including armed forces, (ii) employees in SOEs, and 
ii) employees in the private sector who are mandated by the regulations of the social security system. 
This 
However, in 
practice, the data on these changes are usually insufficient so that a simplified method is employed to 
f new entrants. The difference between the number of insurable 
popul
the insurable population: (i) government officials, 
(i
figure may be projected by using their respective proportions of the total employment of the 
economy. 
The number of active contributors is then measured by using the respective assumed compliance 
rate of each section of the insurable population. In principle, this number must be projected by adding 
up new entrants, and subtracting the dead and discontinued beneficiaries of the scheme. 
obtain relatively stable inflows o
ation and the number of active contributors is the number of inactive contributors (Figure 6). 
 
Number of Pensioners 
In general, for the projections of the number of pensioners for retirement, survivors, employment 
injury, and disability, a life table of general population will be employed. This expresses the probability 
of death of the population by different age groups and sex (see Appendix).  
In Vietnam, there are two types of pensioners, i.e. pre-1995 and post-1995. The former is paid 
direct
re-1995 Pensioners 
oners due to retirement, employment injury, and disability are projected 
umber of discontinued 
 
ly by the government budget, and the number of beneficiaries decreases over time due to death, 
discontinuation, and no new entrants. Conversely, the latter is paid by the VSI under the PAYG defined-
benefit scheme, and the number of beneficiaries may increase because of new entrants. Hence, 
projections of the number of pensioners in the pension scheme in Vietnam must be separated according 
to these two types of pensioners. 
 
P
• The numbers of pensi
by using the life tables of the general population.  
• The number of survivors can also be measured by using the life tables of the general population. 
However, the projected numbers also depend on the n
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 Figure 6. Projection for Active Contributors 
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The method of projection for post-1995 pensioners follows the mathematical expressions on a 
ear-by-year basis (see Appendix). These ex  be applied on a quinquennial 
ertain assumptions. Note that, both pre-1995 and post-1995 retirees are paid the expenses for health 
are, and therefore the projected health care expense for each kind of retiree is based on its historical 
roportion in total expense for retirement. 
• The projected number of retirees is the sum of (i) the projected 
projected number of new entrants to retirement benefits. 
• The number of injured and disabled is projected by using life tables of the general population, 
and the probabilities of having employment injury and disability. 
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Average Insurable Earnings or Wages, and Average Pensions   
Projections of average earnings of the contributors, and average pensions for pensioners are 
elopment of wage levels. In the status-quo projection, average earnings and 
pensio
subject to the past dev
ns are adjusted to the statutory minimum wage. They will be, however, adjusted to the projected 
inflation rates in the sensitivity tests. 
 
Investment of the Reserves 
The reserves of the scheme will be invested in different financial institutions. The most important 
factor
macroec as been heavily regulated 
and m
the gov turns. 
 
 affecting investments is the interest rate. Interest rates can be adopted from the projections of 
onomic factors. In Vietnam, however, investment of the reserves h
anaged by the government, so that the expected rate of return may be based on the regulations of 
ernment concerning investments of the scheme, and past rates of re
Other Expenses and Incomes 
Other expenses, such as administrative expenses, delivery fees, and other incomes defined as 
subsidies from the government for training, construction, etc. are measured as a certain proportion of the 
total expenditure or income. 
 
Financial Indicators of the Scheme 
ial indicators of the pension scheme that should be considered following 
the pr
o components, i.e. the 
e dependency ratio, which indicates the total number of pensioners as a percentage of the 
tributors, and replacement ratio, which implies the average pension as a 
mium (GAP): this indicator implies a contribution rate that balances 
the scheme financially in a certain period of time, say 10 years. This indicator is useful in 
tions of the scheme. However, GAP requires a very stable 
. Sensitivity Tests 
 
becau
mode
There are several financ
ojections because they measure the financial status of the scheme during the projection period. 
 
PAYG Cost Rate: the PAYG cost rate is the sustainable contribution rate, and is calculated by 
dividing total expenditure by total insurable earnings. This yields the contribution rate needed to 
meet the cost of benefits in the corresponding year. It is separated into tw
schem
total number of active con
percentage of average insurable earnings. 
 
General Average Pre
comparing different modifica
and prospective financial market, which in turn requires a long-term healthy economy. 
 
5
The actuarial valuation of the pension scheme cannot project the future with perfect accuracy 
se the projections may be based on imperfect models and assumptions, and the variables in the 
ls may react to unpredictable factors. There are many possible causes leading to distorted results, 
13 
 such 
that m . The sensitivity tests of an actuarial model for pension 
scheme are usually re-calibration of key variables, e.g. economic growth, employment level, price and 
real w
tests 
rate o
 
V. ACTUARIAL PROJECTION RESULTS 
 
,300 thousand people in 
2050.
 percent in 2025, and to 45 percent in 2050. 
urthermore, the replacement rate will also increase from 56.5 percent in 2000 to 57.7 percent and 59.3 
ercent in 2025 and 2050, respectively. 
rent scenarios of the economy, i.e. favorable and 
nfavorable economic conditions. The following are results of these scenarios regarding the financial 
status 
us “Ponzi 
game”
as lack of or low credibility of data. Therefore, sensitivity tests can inform us of the eventual gaps 
ay occur between projections and reality
age growth, rate of return on investments, and disability incidence rates. 
Regarding the financial status of the pension scheme in Vietnam, this paper performs sensitivity 
on labor force participation rates, pension scheme compliance rates, wage indexation, and nominal 
f returns on investment of the scheme’s reserves. 
 
I
The model predicts the following results. 
First, the number of pre-1995 pensioners will decrease from 2,200 thousand in 2000 to 713,000 in 
2025 and to 32,000 in 2050. Accordingly, the total expenditure will be 13,980 billion VND in 2000, 
15,272 billion VND in 2025, and then will drastically decrease to 1,906 billion VND in 2050. 
Second, for the post-1995 scheme, the number of active contributors will increase from 
approximately 4,500 thousand in 2000 to 7,600 thousand in 2025 and to 10
 Similarly, the number of pensioners will increase from 243 thousand in 2000 to 1,700 thousand in 
2025, and to 4,100 thousand people in 2050; and therefore the demographic ratio of the scheme will 
increase rapidly from only 5.4 percent in 2000 to 23
F
p
Third, sensitivity tests are conducted with diffe
u
of the scheme. 
Table 3 shows that the implicit pension debts (IPD) of both schemes, when compared with GDP 
2000, are generally high even at various assumed discount rates. These IPDs imply that if Vietnam 
continues its PAYG defined-benefit pension scheme, it is playing an expensive and dangero
, especially from the financial viewpoint. On social aspects, these IPDs must be borne by the 
current and future working population so that inter-generational inequity is unavoidable. 
 
Table 3. Implicit Pension Debt (IPD) of the Pension Scheme, 2000-2050 
IPD, compared with GDP 2000 Discount Rate 
Pre-1995 Scheme Post-1995 Scheme 
3% 87 108 
5% 66 63 
6% 59 50 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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 Table 4. PAYG Cost Rates and GAP of the Pension Scheme 
Maintaining Scheme in 
(years) 
GAP  
(%) 
Year PAYG Cost Rates  
(%) 
0 3,2  2000 3,1 
10 4,8  2010 7,7 
20 8,0  2020 11,8 
30 10,6 14,7  2030 
40 13,8 2040  21,8 
50 17,  2050 26,5 4 
Note: The b ar is 2000. 
Source: Aut calculation 
 
able 4 indicates the sustainable contribution rates to maintain this expensive scheme through 
two in icators, i.e. PAYG Cost Rate and General Average Premium (GAP). Due to the technical 
differences in calculation, the results of these two indicators are different. They imply, however, that the 
current contribution e near future. For 
instance, after 2030 the PAYG Cost Ra er than 15 percent so that the scheme will be 
depleted with this contribution rate. The scenario is similar with the GAP indicator, which shows that 
the scheme can only aintained for 40  with thi contri rate. 
All financial indicators of the schem rticularly the PAYG Cost Rate, the GAP and the IPDs, 
imply that the curren nsion scheme in Vietnam will not be fi lly sustainab e context of an 
aging society and namically efficient economy. There eform of th eme is needed 
imme
 
 
V. RE
te will be different. For example, Figure 7 shows how to solve IPD with a discount rate of 
 percent. In this case, the average tax rate is 1.34 percent. This expenditure-smoothing schedule is 
upported by issuing government bonds at the beginning. 
 
 
ase ye
hor’s 
T
d
 rate at 15 percent is not enough to maintain the scheme in th
te will be great
 be m years s bution 
e, pa
t pe nancia le in th
a dy  fore, r e sch
diately. 
FORMING THE PENSION SCHEME IN VIETNAM 
 
This section deals with the IPDs of pre-1995 and post-1995 schemes in order to avoid 
bankrupting the government budget (for the former), and the social fund (for the latter). 
 
1. Pre-1995 Scheme 
 
In order to deal with this debt, an inter-temporal budget constraint method is employed. For 
simplicity, we suppose that the government will pay these liabilities via a given amount of tax in each 
year, which is a certain percentage of respective nominal GDP. With different economic scenarios, the 
average tax ra
5
s
 
 
15 
 Figure 7. Pre-1995 Scheme: Solving IPD with Discount Rate of 5 Percent 
 
2. Post-199
 
Designing a 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
5 Scheme 
New Pension Scheme 
There are various types of pension schemes suitable for reform. However, the only
future financial difficulties is to shift from the current PAYG scheme to a funded scheme. Parti
nds on the specific status of the pension scheme and socio-economic ability of th
 scheme is preferred for the following crucial reasons. 
First, a funded scheme will raise the economic benefits for the participants because the
working life, and then finance themselves when they are retired. During the tim
lation, saving can be invested in financial markets to earn interest, which is much hi
plicit rate of return generated by a PAYG scheme (Feldstein, 1998). 
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 way to avoid 
al or full 
shift depe e country. A 
funded
y can save 
during their e of 
accumu gher than 
the im This result is apparent 
because there  real rate of return in a PAYG scheme, in which contributions 
f the current contributors are immediately paid for the current pensioners. This process in a PAYG 
er-generational inequity because the current pensioners may gain higher benefits 
an the contributions they paid during their working life due to changed economic conditions, e.g. 
efits, in turn, are paid by current contributions of the participants. 
This i
nded scheme is associated with increases 
in pri
 is no real investment and no
o
scheme also creates int
th
higher average real wage. These ben
s a vicious cycle of inter-generational inequity in a PAYG pension scheme. 
Second, and more importantly, shifting to a funded scheme will avoid unaffordable benefit 
promises, and thus avoid abrupt increases in the contribution rates as the population ages. This result is 
already pointed out in the projections. Further, shifting to a fu
vate savings in the long-term, thus building long-term national saving, and eventually economic 
growth. However, financing methods for shifting should be thoroughly discussed because it will be 
16 
 meaningless if it crowds out other forms of private saving, or leads to greater public deficits (Estelle 
James, 1998). 
Another issue is the desirability to move from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution scheme 
for many reasons. The main rationale is that the participants’ benefits are closely linked with their 
contributions in the defined-contribution scheme, and this prevents them from evading contributions. 
Under a defined-contribution scheme, evasion of contributions means that participants reduce their own 
pensions; while evasion of contributions in a defined-benefit scheme helps participants to earn benefits 
by “e
fits will be automatically adjusted by an actuarially fair annuity, so that neither aging nor 
early 
n scheme needs to be carried 
out so
the current beneficiaries. Therefore, notional defined-contribution, although ostensibly 
define
ortantly, the notional interest rate during contributions and conversion 
rate o
xploiting” others, particularly current and future participants. In the case of Vietnam, evasion is a 
significant problem in the current scheme with very low participation rates and compliance rates within 
the private sector. Moving to a defined-contribution scheme along with an expansion of coverage, 
therefore, ensures appropriate rights of participants, and reduces evasion. 
In addition, as shown in various investigations, a defined-contribution scheme discourages early 
retirement and makes financial viability less sensitive to early retirement decisions. In this scenario, the 
retirement bene
retirement affect the financial viability of the pension scheme. Moreover, a defined-contribution 
scheme also prevents fraudulent disability claims whereby beneficiaries enjoy benefits at the expense of 
the others.  
Conversely, in a defined-benefit scheme, early retirement and disability entitlement are frequently 
observed because the early retirees and the disabled can collect greater benefits than they wait until 
retirement. Moreover, with aging population, the government will be confronted with the difficult task 
of raising the retirement age continually to keep up with longevity  (Estelle James, 1998). Regarding 
this issue, in Vietnam there is a large proportion of pensioners who are retired or disabled in the most 
productive age group of aged 35 to 44, and thereby a defined-contributio
 as to avoid this situation. 
Recently, the notional defined-contribution scheme has emerged as, to some extent, a successful 
solution for pension reform in some countries, such as Sweden (Disney, 1998), and Italy (Franco, 2001). 
In this scheme, participants have their own accounts, which record accumulations and interest earned 
from these accumulations; but these accounts are notional because contributions are actually used to pay 
directly for 
d-contribution, is still a PAYG. In comparison with a PAYG defined-benefit scheme, a notional 
defined-contribution may be more favored because contributions and benefits have a closer link, and the 
transition costs can be avoided by keeping both contributions and benefits in the same PAYG scheme. 
With regard to inter-generational equity, however, a notional defined-contribution scheme cannot 
completely solve the problem. Firstly, as with the nature of a PAYG scheme, a notional defined-
contribution does not avoid increased contribution rates in the future, and therefore creates inter-
generational inequity. More imp
f annuity for retirement are subject to political manipulation (Estelle James 1996, 1998, Kotlikoff, 
2000) because it is easy for government to change benefit formula. Secondly, as indicated in Kunieda 
(2001), a notional defined-contribution may reduce inter-generational inequity only when it is used for 
reducing the current benefits received by pensioners, and reforming the pension scheme to a notional 
17 
 defined-contribution becomes meaningless if the benefit level of the current pensioners is kept the same, 
or if the notional return rate is higher than population growth plus per capita income growth in a 
dynamically efficient economy. 
 
Reforming the Pension Scheme 
In designing a pension scheme, it helps to study general scenarios with specific characteristics 
that can maintain the financial viability of the scheme and ensure inter-generational equity of the 
participants. From these scenarios, the following reforms can be implemented. 
Firstly, we consider reducing the benefits of the current pensioners to maintain inter-generational 
equality, as well as intra-generational equality. 
In fact, by using the last five years’ average wage as the base wage for the retirement benefit of 
the public sector, the pension scheme is paying for numerous rich retirees who do not pay any tax for 
their high pension income. This policy means that we do not need to cut benefits of all current 
pensioners, but need to cut benefits of the rich pensioners, and maintain benefits of others who have 
sufficient pension income. An important lesson learned from Kunieda (2001) is that not only can we 
reduce benefits, but also tax the pension income of the rich pensioners more heavily in order to achieve 
from PAYG to a funded 
schem
is movement makes the implicit pension debt of PAYG 
schem
on the success of curtailing growth in the debt of SOEs (IMF, 2002). Therefore, we should 
move
 
burde
eme. There are some policies to help spread and absorb this burden. For example, Friedman 
et al. 
ts to notional defined-contribution pension, which must provide only 
the re
equality. 
Furthermore, we also can adjust benefits by changing the indexation method, i.e. from statutory 
wage to price indexation. This helps reflect the true cost of living of the pensioners. 
Secondly, we consider solving the implicit pension debt when moving 
e.  
This is a very significant issue because th
e explicit. If the pension scheme moves fully to a funded scheme, it creates a new explicit 
national debt, which is equal to the present value of net implicit pension debt, and therefore threatens 
the government’s fiscal viability. 
In the year 2001, government debt accounted for 30 percent of GDP; of which domestic debt was 
about 3 percent, and the remaining 27 percent was external debt. However, the level of public debt 
(excluding bank debt and including enterprise debt of SOEs) was 63 percent of GDP, and depended 
critically 
 to a partially funded scheme in order to avoid swiftly increasing government debt. 
Additionally, during the transition, the current contributors must bear the so-called “double
n”, meaning that they have to pay for themselves and for the current pensioners who belong to the 
PAYG sch
(1996), Estelle James (1998) suggest the model used by Latin American countries and some other 
transitional economies. They used revenue or assets from the privatization process of state enterprises to 
co-finance fiscal requirements for existing pensioners. Kunieda (2001) recommends allocating some 
part of individual pension accoun
turn rate that equals the economic growth rate; and because this rate is lower than the other capital 
return rates in a dynamically efficient economy, each generation will bear some of the double burden. 
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 For Vietnam, at this moment, application of the latter seems feasible because privatization itself is 
facing financial difficulties, and other government revenues are also extremely limited. 
Thirdly, we consider the timing of the reform. 
As indicated in previous studies, such as Feldstein (1998), the timing of reform depends on the 
popularity of the PAYG pension scheme in the country because it has close links with the amount of net 
implicit pension debt. In the case of Vietnam, the pension scheme covers 12 percent of total 
employment, or only 6 percent of the total population, and the first cohort of the post-1995 scheme will 
start receiving benefits in 2015 (their first contributions were in 1995, and they are only fully entitled 
after at least 20 years of contributions). Therefore, Vietnam should start reforming as soon as possible; 
otherwise, the transition will inevitably be more painful. 
Lastly, we consider the management and regulatory framework of the pension scheme. 
Many investigations on the management of pension schemes favor privately-managed rather than 
publicly managed schemes, mainly because of political reasons. Examples are given in Oliveira (1997), 
Felds less, with the current development level of the 
Vietn
ent of the pension scheme is the shortage of 
inform fraudulent 
mana
 investments of the pension fund across various instruments in the 
financ
tein (1998), and Estelle James (1998). Neverthe
amese economy, especially the financial market, the private management of pension schemes is 
not really feasible at this moment. In my opinion, the government can manage the pension fund with 
investment-based policies to maintain and develop it. The government should not use the fund to cover 
expenditure or budget deficits. In the medium- to long-term, however, the government should gradually 
privatize the pension fund in order to urge more savings in a funded, defined-contribution pension 
scheme as a channel for investment. 
Further, one of the weakest points in the managem
ation. Insufficient or closed information on operations has generated problems, such as 
gement. The lack of information also has caused difficulty for policy-makers in finding 
appropriate policy alternatives to manage the scheme. Hence, information dissemination, or disclosure, 
is one of the prerequisites for reform. 
In addition to management, a sound regulatory framework is also needed. The government should 
carry out policies that encourage the participation of the private sector, and promote the voluntary 
scheme. Further, during the transition stage, the government should strictly regulate on retirement and 
disability by setting up the minimum retirement age, and create more accurate definitions of disability 
levels. Specifically, in the financial framework, the government has to offer a fair tax treatment among 
all insurance businesses, and diversify
ial market. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The conclusions of the paper are: (i) the current pension scheme in Vietnam is not financially 
sustainable in the context of an aging population, i.e. it is financially unstable, and involves a vicious 
cycle of inter-generational inequality; and (ii) there is an immediate need to reform the current PAYG 
19 
 defined-benefit scheme for a partially-funded defined-contribution scheme which has appropriate 
policies and management within a sound regulatory framework. 
The paper makes use of actuarial models, which are based on the available and assumed 
projections on population, economy, and the pension scheme. The projections have some limitations. 
Most of the limitations are derived from the simplified assumptions in the models, which are due to 
s of the paper that need to be addressed. 
irst, projections of macroeconomic indicators, labor market, and the pension scheme are mostly based 
on int
h generation should be calibrated so as 
to dev
insufficient or unavailable data. There are two main limitation
F
erpolation techniques with available data with a possibility of over- or under-estimation. In 
addition, the paper also ignored the impacts of the pension scheme on saving, investment, and economic 
growth in the future. Second, although inter-generational inequity is discussed in this paper, it was not 
analyzed quantitatively by generation, and the financial burden of each age cohort of the current and 
future generations was not measured. The financial burden of eac
ise more appropriate policy options. These limitations suggest that additional studies are needed, 
using more comprehensive models that thoroughly take into account various aspects of population, 
economy, and pension scheme reforms. 
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 Appendix 1 
Vietnamese Life Table by Age Group and Sex, 1999 
 
Male Female 
Age 5mx 5qx lx e0x 5mx 5qx lx e0x
0 0.0290 0.0283 100,000 64.65 0.0218 0.0214 100,000 68.64 
1 0.0029 0.0115 97,174 65.52 0.0026 0.0103 97,862 69.13 
5 0.0010 0.0052 96,052 62.27 0.0006 0.0032 96,856 65.84 
10 0.0008 0.0041 95,555 57.58 0.0005 0.0026 96,550 61.04 
15 0.0014 0.0068 95,159 52.81 0.0010 0.0048 96,298 56.19 
20 0.0018 0.0089 94,515 48.15 0.0013 0.0066 95,839 51.54 
25 0.0017 0.0087 93,679 43.56 0.0012 0.0062 95,209 46.77 
30 0.0024 0.0120 92,863 38.92 0.0015 0.0077 94,617 42.05 
35 0.0030 0.0149 91,749 34.36 0.0018 0.0090 93,892 37.35 
40 0.0042 0.0210 90,384 29.84 0.0027 0.0133 93,046 32.67 
45 0.0068 0.0333 88,487 25.43 0.0043 0.0215 91,807 28.08 
50 0.0112 0.0546 85,539 21.22 0.0073 0.0357 89,836 23.64 
55 0.0185 0.0884 80,871 17.30 0.0120 0.0581 86,626 19.42 
60 0.0316 0.1464 73,724 13.74 0.0215 0.1020 81,591 15.47 
65 0.0511 0.2265 62,928 10.66 0.0372 0.1700 73,265 11.94 
70 0.0827 0.3426 48,676 8.05 0.0671 0.2873 60,811 8.87 
75 0.1322 0.4968 32,000 5.95 0.1138 0.4429 43,338 6.44 
80 0.2039 0.6754 16,101 4.35 0.1881 0.6398 24,145 4.57 
85+ 0.3119 1 5,227 3.21 0.0370 1 8,698 3.26 
Note: 5mx is the central death rate for the age interval (x, x+5);  
                5qx is the probability of an individual at age x dying before the end of the age interval (x, x+5). 
          lx is the number of survivors at age x in a life table with starting population of 100,000; and 
          e0x is life expectancy at age x. 
Source: World Health Organization (2000) 
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 Appendix 2 
 
Projections of Post-1995 Scheme 
 
The following expressions for the age- and sex-specific one-year transition probabilities are based 
on the rules of addition and multiplication of probabilities. 
Each iteration is assumed to operate immediately after the retirements (occurring at the end of 
each year of age) have taken place. Under the assumption of uniform distribution of decrements over 
each year of age, the decrements affecting active persons, retirees and existing disability [in (3), (4), (6) 
and (8)] are assumed to occur, on average, at the end of six months. 
(1) Active to active:   )1)(1( 1
**)(
+−−−= xxaxaax riqp
(2) Active to retiree:   1
**)( )1( +−−= xxaxarx riqp
(3) Active to disability:   )5.01(*)( ixx
ai
x qip −=
(4) Active to widow/widower:  )](5.01[ **5.0
*)1(
xx y
w
yx
a
x
aw
x hqwqq +−= +
(5) Retiree to retiree:  px
rr
x qp −=1)(
(6) Retiree to widow/widower:  )](5.01[ **5.0
)(
xx y
w
yx
p
x
rw
x hqwqq +−= +
(7) Disability to disability:  ix
ii
x qp −= 1)(
(8) Disability to widow/widower:  )](5.01[ **5.0
)(
xx y
w
yx
i
x
iw
x hqwqq +−= +
(9) Widow/widower to widow/widower:  x
w
x
ww
x hqp
**)( 1 −−=
where: 
• The active service table , where b is the youngest entry age, and r is the 
highest retirement age. This is a double decrement table allowing for the decrements of 
death and disability only. The associated dependent rates of decrement are denoted by 
(mortality) and  (disability). Rx denoting the proportion retiring at age x. 
rxbl ax ≤≤},{
 * axq xi
*
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 • The life table for disability  and the associated independent mortality rate 
. 
wxbl ix ≤≤},{
 ixq
• The life table for retired persons, (where r* is the lowest retirement age), 
and the associated independent rate of mortality . 
wxrl px ≤≤*},{
p
xq
• The double decrement table for widow/widower,  (y* is the lowest age of 
a widow, widower), and the associated dependent rates of decrements,  (mortality), and 
(remarried). 
wyyl wx ≤≤*},{
w
yq
*
yh
*
• The single decrement table for orphans, , where z* is the age limit for 
orphans’ pensions, and the associated independent rate of decrement . 
*0},{ zzl oz ≤≤
0
zq
• wx is the proportion of married persons among those dying at age x. 
• yx is the average age of the spouse of the person dying at age x. 
• nx is the average number of orphans of a person dying at age x. 
• zx is the average age of the above orphans. 
Source: Iyer (1999) 
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